Sunday, April 29, 2018

Oracle JDK on Fedora 27

This post explains how I install the Oracle JDK on Fedora 27.

1. Download


Validate the checksum against the published values listed here: https://www.oracle.com/webfolder/s/digest/10-0-1checksum.html
$ shasum -a 256 jdk-10.0.1_linux-x64_bin.tar.gz

2. Install

I like to install the JDK in /opt/java.
$ cd /opt/java
$ tar -xf jdk-10.0.1_linux-x64_bin.tar.gz

Now there should be a directory on the system that looks like /opt/java/jdk-10.0.1. In order to make updating the JDK easier in the future, create a symlink at /opt/java/latest that points to the latest installed version. This way we won't have to update the alternatives every time we update!
$ ln -s jdk-10.0.1 latest

3. Update alternatives

Fedora ships with OpenJDK installed by default and there are a bunch of packages that depend on it. However, we can use the alternatives command to allow the Oracle JDK and OpenJDK to coexist.

First let's tell alternatives about the Oracle JDK binaries:
$ alternatives --install /usr/bin/java java /opt/java/latest/bin/java 1000
$ alternatives --install /usr/bin/javaws javaws /opt/java/latest/bin/javaws 1000
$ alternatives --install /usr/bin/javac javac /opt/java/latest/bin/javac 1000
$ alternatives --install /usr/bin/jar jar /opt/java/latest/bin/jar 1000

Now we can make sure the correct version of the java command is selected, and update the configuration if necessary:
$ alternatives --config java

4. Verify

Let's make sure the Oracle JDK version of /usr/bin/java is being used:
$ java -version
java version "10.0.1" 2018-04-17
Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment 18.3 (build 10.0.1+10)
Java HotSpot(TM) 64-Bit Server VM 18.3 (build 10.0.1+10, mixed mode)

Final Thoughts

When a new Oracle JDK is released, we can just install it in /opt/java and update the symlink!

Sunday, January 29, 2017

Monitoring Telemetry for the DJI Phantom 3

I picked up a DJI Phantom 3 Standard drone about 6 months ago, and since the first time I flew it around my yard using the controller and DJI Go Android app, I've wondered about the possibility of using some kind of PC-based ground station software to control it.

If the DJI Go app uses WiFi to communicate with the drone, then in theory so could an application running on a laptop, right?

I did a little searching and found out that, at least for this model, DJI doesn't offer any official ground station software. That's when my gears started turning; Could I write some software to control the Phantom 3? We'll see, but the first step is trying to understand how the DJI Go app and the drone communicate, which is the subject of this post.

Recon


The first thing I needed to do is understand what systems are present on the Phantom 3 WLAN.

Note: Remove the propellers before turning the system on indoors!

I powered up the Phantom 3 and remote controller, then I connected my laptop to the PHANNTOM_240536 network. This network uses WPA pre-shared key authentication with a default password of 12341234 (which I should probably change). Once connected, I noticed that my laptop was given the IP Address 192.168.1.21 with a netmask of 255.255.255.0. Knowing the subnet in use on the Phantom 3 WLAN, I used an nmap ping sweep to find active hosts.

[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ nmap -sP 192.168.1.0/24

Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-01-29 16:40 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1
Host is up (0.0016s latency).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.2
Host is up (0.011s latency).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.3
Host is up (0.020s latency).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.20
Host is up (0.042s latency).
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.21
Host is up (0.00020s latency).

My laptop is .21, the tablet is .20, so the .1-.3 addresses must be parts of the DJI system. Next I tried to see if there was anything else nmap could tell me. To do that I used an nnap port scan for each of the Phantom 3 system hosts.

[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ sudo nmap -p 1-65535 -sS 192.168.1.1

Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-01-29 17:09 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1
Host is up (0.0051s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed ports
PORT     STATE SERVICE
21/tcp   open  ftp
2345/tcp open  dbm
MAC Address: 60:60:1F:24:05:36 (SZ DJI Technology)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 22.29 seconds

The numerical part of the Phantom 3 WLAN SSID seems to be three of the octets from the MAC address of this host.

[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ sudo nmap -p 1-65535 -sS 192.168.1.2

Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-01-29 17:09 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.2
Host is up (0.066s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed ports
PORT     STATE SERVICE
21/tcp   open  ftp
5678/tcp open  rrac
MAC Address: 60:60:1F:10:1B:E3 (SZ DJI Technology)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.70 seconds

[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ sudo nmap -p 1-65535 -sS 192.168.1.3

Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-01-29 17:10 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.3
Host is up (0.074s latency).
Not shown: 65532 closed ports
PORT   STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open  ftp
22/tcp open  ssh
23/tcp open  telnet
MAC Address: 4E:EC:D3:3F:BB:B3 (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 33.35 seconds

Well, nothing earth shattering there. I'll just keep this info for reference. After some googling, I was able to learn from [1] and [3] that the systems above have the following assignments:

192.168.1.1 - Controller
192.168.1.2 - Aircraft
192.168.1.3 - Camera

This is really helpful information, because it allows me to focus on what I'm really after: telemetry from the aircraft itself.

Passive Monitoring


Now that I had some understanding of the network, the next step was to monitor the WLAN and see who's talking to who. For this part I used my trusty Alfa USB WLAN adapter and Wireshark. Something I didn't realize right away is that WPA-PSK uses information other than just the pre-shared key to encrypt communications between hosts. This means that simply authenticating to the access point doesn't grant me access to all the traffic on the WLAN. In order to do that, I'll have to monitor the WPA client authentication sequence to grab all of the crypto material necessary to decrypt communications between the Phantom 3 and the DJI Go app running on the Android tablet. That all sounds super complicated, but luckily Wireshark and aircrack-ng can do most of the work.

I needed to put the Alfa card into Monitoring mode, and as a prerequisite step I had to disable some conflicting services.

[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ sudo airmon-ng check kill
[user@eb8570p dji_re]$ sudo airmon-ng start wlp0s20u2 6

The 6 here is the channel we want to monitor. My Phantom 3 seems to be configured to use channel 6.

With the WLAN adapter in Monitor mode, it's time to get Wireshark set up. First we need to tell wireshark about the WPA pre-shared key for the PHANTOM_240536 SSID. To do that, the Key can be entered in the IEEE-802.11 preferences dialog. This dialog can be accessed by navigating to Edit -> Preferences-> Protocols -> IEEE-802.11. Then click the Edit button to edit decryption keys. In the WEP and WPA Decryption Keys dialog, click the New button, then select wpa-psk, and enter your key in the form: psk:ssid. For me this looked like: 12341234:PHANTOM_240536.

Now that the interface is in Monitor mode and Wireshark is ready to listen, we need to make sure Wireshark is able to capture the client authentication handshake from the tablet. The easiest way to do this is to kick the tablet off the WLAN to force it to re-authenticate. This is done with aireplay-ng.

sudo aireplay-ng -0 1 -a 60:60:1f:24:05:36 -c bc:76:5e:6a:d4:b3 wlp0s20u2mon
The -a argument specifies the MAC address of the access point, and the -c argument specifies the MAC address of the client.

With airmon-ng and Wireshark ready to monitor the WLAN, I powered on the drone and controller, then started the DJI Go app on the tablet.


Right away the app connects to 192.168.1.1 on port 2345, and shortly thereafter also connects to 192.168.1.2 on port 5678. At a glance, both of these conversations seem to be mostly the Phantom 3 talking to the tablet, with a packets going the other direction every once in a while. My guess is that once the app connects, .1 and .2 stream status information to the app, while the app occasionally sends commands.


Finally, there's a UDP (UDT) handshake with 192.168.1.3, followed by a constant stream of data from 192.168.1.3 to the tablet, which I'm guessing is the encoded video.

Protocol Analysis


Assuming the UDP traffic is video, I focused my attention on the two TCP connections. Furthermore, I focused on the packets going from the Phantom 3 to the tablet. I figured if I can write a program to connect to these TCP servers and report telemetry for the drone, that would be pretty cool. I can always add command and control capabilities later... I've included the first 8 bytes of some received payloads below (I stripped out beyond that because some of the packets probably include location data).

55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 4C 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 4D 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 4E 2D
55 19 04 E4 1B 02 7D 0A
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 4F 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 50 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 51 2D
55 12 04 C7 0E 02 52 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 53 2D
55 0D 04 33 1B 02 7E 0A
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 54 2D
55 0E 04 66 1B 02 7F 0A
55 0E 04 66 1B 02 80 0A
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 55 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 56 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 57 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 58 2D
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 59 2D
55 19 04 E4 1B 02 84 0A
55 1A 04 B1 0E 02 5A 2D

After exporting the payloads and staring at them for a while, a couple patterns emerge. First, there's some kind of preamble or magic byte (0x55) at the beginning of each payload. Next, the second byte always matches the length of the payload in bytes. Also, the last two bytes of the payloads seem to vary randomly for each packet. I'm guessing there's a 16 bit checksum or CRC at the end of the messages, but I've been unable to figure out exactly how that's calculated. So there are preamble, length, and integrity check fields in the PDU; pretty normal stuff, and that's a good start.

I can see that the 3rd and 6th bytes never change. I've disconnected the app and reconnected several times, and these are always the same. I'm guessing these bytes include some flag bits. After looking at lots of data, I've concluded that byte 4 is probably some kind of message type indicator. In my collected data, I only see about 10 different values here, and they always correspond to the same payload lengths. Byte 5 is interesting because it changes, but only between a couple observed values. It could be flags, or it could be part of a multi-byte field that I don't understand yet.

Interestingly, byte 7 seems to increment two distinct counters.

Next Steps


The remainder of the payloads are going to be tough to decode. I think my best bet is to go for the low-hanging fruit, and try to find the position and attitude data. With the drone sitting on the table, that data should be relatively static, and if I were designing this protocol I'd probably use either 16 or 32 bits to represent angles. If I hold the drone steady and rotate just one axis, the data might give the fields away.

More to come in follow up posts...

References


I found the following useful sources of information while researching the Phantom 3 protocol:
[1] http://dronesec.xyz/2017/01/25/hacking-the-dji-phantom-3/ This blog post includes a lot of the same information as my research, except that it's written from an information security perspective.
[2] https://github.com/noahwilliamsson/dji-phantom-vision GitHub project for the Phantom 2 protocol, which has some similarities to what I've observed, but seems to be a different protocol.
[3] http://forum.dji.com/thread-55122-1-1.html Forum post about discovery of the Phantom 3 WLAN hosts and their roles in the system.
[4] https://github.com/hardening/Cave/blob/master/phantom3-video.cpp GitHub - C++ program to grab Phantom 3 UDT video.
[5] https://wiki.wireshark.org/HowToDecrypt802.11 How to decrypt 802.11 packets in Wireshark.
[6] https://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=deauthentication How to disassociate wireless clients.

Monday, November 4, 2013

Suricata on CentOS 6

This post will cover building and installing the Suricata IDS on CentOS 6.4.  This procedure is adapted from the following documentation from openinfosecfoundation.org:

https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/wiki/CentOS_56_Installation
https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/wiki/Basic_Setup

The following procedure assumes at least a minimal CentOS 6.4 installation with the base package group installed.

Not all of the prerequisite packages for building suricata are included in the CentOS repositories, so the EPEL package repository will fill in the gaps.

Add the EPEL repo to your system if you haven't already:

# rpm -Uvh http://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/6/i386/epel-release-6-8.noarch.rpm
Start by installing the prerequisite packages: (may take some time depending on your system and internet connection)

# yum install gcc gcc-c++ make automake autoconf libtool pcre pcre-devel libyaml libyaml-devel libpcap libpcap-devel file-libs file-devel libpcap libpcap-devel zlib zlib-devel libnet libnet-devel libcap-ng libcap-ng-devel
I've chosen to install gcc and autotools individually rather than install the Development Tools package group.  I think it's a good practice to limit unnecessary software on internet-accessible systems or systems with security-related roles, so I don't want a lot of the packages that come in the Development Tools group.  In fact, if you're really serious about security you would probably want to compile suricata on a development machine and leave gcc and autotools off of your production systems altogether.

Download and extract the suricata source tarball from openinfosecfoundation.org:

# wget http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/download/suricata-1.4.6.tar.gz # tar -xzf suricata-1.4.6.tar.gz
Now build and install suricata:
# cd suricata-1.4.6 # ./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc --localstatedir=/var # make # make install-full
I've chosen the install-full target for installation, because this will create directories and install some rules and configuration files for us.

Now that suricata is built and installed we can go about configuring it and installing some support scripts.  I'm using oinkmaster set up to take care of updating the rules on my system.  Download the oinkmaster tarball from http://oinkmaster.sourceforge.net/download.shtml.  (I don't want to post a direct link because I'd have to choose a mirror for you, and I'd rather not)

Extract the files and install oinkmaster.conf and oinkmaster.pl on your system.
# tar -xzf oinkmaster-2.0.tar.gz # cd oinkmaster-2.0 # cp oinkmaster.pl /usr/bin # cp oinkmaster.conf /etc
Edit /etc/oinkmaster.conf and correct the url:
url = http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/suricata/emerging.rules.tar.gz
We can now test oinkmaster:
# oinkmaster -C /etc/oinkmaster.conf -o /etc/suricata/rules
If all went well you should have a whole bunch of *.rules files in /etc/suricata/rules.  You probably want oinkmaster to update your IDS rules automatically, so something like the following in your crontab will do the trick.  For more information see: http://oinkmaster.sourceforge.net/readme.shtml.

30 2 * * * oinkmaster.pl -C /etc/oinkmaster.conf -o /etc/suricata/rules 2>&1 | logger -t oinkmaster
In order to make suricata process these rules we'll have to update its configuration.  First get a list of all the rules in /etc/suricata/rules with something like:
# ls /etc/suricata/rules/*.rules
We need to make sure all these rule files are listed in the suricata configuration, so open up /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml and check the rule-files section against the list of rule files.

The rule-files section in my suricata.yaml looks like this:

rule-files: - botcc.rules - ciarmy.rules - compromised.rules - decoder-events.rules - drop.rules - dshield.rules - emerging-activex.rules - emerging-attack_response.rules - emerging-chat.rules - emerging-current_events.rules - emerging-deleted.rules - emerging-dns.rules - emerging-dos.rules - emerging-exploit.rules - emerging-ftp.rules - emerging-games.rules - emerging-icmp_info.rules - emerging-icmp.rules - emerging-imap.rules - emerging-inappropriate.rules - emerging-info.rules - emerging-malware.rules - emerging-misc.rules - emerging-mobile_malware.rules - emerging-netbios.rules - emerging-p2p.rules - emerging-policy.rules - emerging-pop3.rules - emerging-rpc.rules - emerging-scada.rules - emerging-scan.rules - emerging-shellcode.rules - emerging-smtp.rules - emerging-snmp.rules - emerging-sql.rules - emerging-telnet.rules - emerging-tftp.rules - emerging-trojan.rules - emerging-user_agents.rules - emerging-voip.rules - emerging-web_client.rules - emerging-web_server.rules - emerging-web_specific_apps.rules - emerging-worm.rules - files.rules - http-events.rules - rbn-malvertisers.rules - rbn.rules - smtp-events.rules - stream-events.rules - tls-events.rules - tor.rules While we're editing suricata.yaml, the classification-file and reference-config-file fields also need to be updated:

classification-file: /etc/suricata/rules/classification.config reference-config-file: /etc/suricata/rules/reference.config

At this point, suricata is configured and can be tested with the following command:

# suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0

For a real IDS setup, we also need an init script for suricata, but I'm going to cover that in a follow up post.

Hope this has been helpful, thanks for reading!


Friday, June 22, 2012

efw-upgrade behind a proxy

The efw-upgrade command will fail for an EFW living on a network that requires use of an HTTP proxy.  To make it work efw-upgrade needs to be configured to use the proxy to download updates and repo data, but there doesn't appear to be any official documentation on how to do this.  EFW uses the Smart Package Manager, and luckily there's good documentation for smart. 

To make efw-upgrade work, use SSH or the console of the EFW to log in as root then run this command:

smart config --set http-proxy=proxyurl

My proxy url looks something like: http://a.b.c.d:8080

Monday, April 2, 2012

libtool version mismatch

Building ec2new on CentOS 6.2, I came across the following error:

libtool: Version mismatch error.  This is libtool 2.4, but the
libtool: definition of this LT_INIT comes from libtool 2.2.6b.
libtool: You should recreate aclocal.m4 with macros from libtool 2.4
libtool: and run autoconf again.

I found references to LT_INIT in ltmain.sh, so I deleted it and ran libtoolize.  After that the build process suggested in INSTALL worked fine.

Saturday, March 31, 2012

WPAD with EFW

My home router is running Endian Firewall Community edition v2.5.1, and I wanted to configure it to support WPAD using DHCP option 252.  The answer is simple but a little harder to find than I expected, so here it is.

Add the following into the "Custom configuration lines" text box on the DHCP Server configuration page in the EFW web-management console, substituting a.b.c.d for the IP Address of your EFW router:

option wpad code 252 = text;
option wpad "http://a.b.c.d/wpad.dat";

In the first line you're telling your DHCP server that option 252 is going to be an ASCII text string with the name wpad.  In the second line you're assigning a string to that option so the server can give it out to clients.  What you're doing here is giving your DHCP clients the URL for a Proxy Auto-Config file, that will tell them the location of the proxy server and possibly some other options.  If you want to check out the PAC file that EFW creates for you, open up that wpad.dat file from your router and take a look at it.

Option 252 is still only a draft, but it's used commonly enough that many DHCP clients and servers implement it.